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Get Out the Vote interventions increase inequality in voter
turnout
Get Out the Vote campaigns have become a fixture of campaign season, especially during recent
elections, which saw unprecedented organization by both sides to rally potential voters. But are
these drives an effective way to close the turnout gap between groups who are already inclined to
be involved in politics and those with a lower predilection to vote? Ryan D. Enos and Anthony
Fowler examine the effects of Get Out the Vote interventions and find that high propensity voters
are more responsive to such initiatives. Rather than closing the turnout gap, they show that such
campaigns actually widen this discrepancy. 
Political campaigns, drawing on rigorous scientific research, now wage a battle over voter-turnout,
enlisting volunteers, staff, and consultants to knock on doors, make phone calls, and send letters
encouraging their supporters to vote. The scale of these efforts has exploded in recent elections,
with the Obama and Romney campaigns each conducting approximately 200 million of these
voter contacts in 2012. In doing so, campaigns are increasing political inequality.
Generally speaking, people that are heavily involved in politics and vote regularly are
demographically and ideologically different than people that don’t vote regularly: they are older, whiter, wealthier,
and more conservative. Put another way, older, whiter, wealthier, conservative people have a greater “propensity
to vote.” These high-propensity types participate more than low-propensity citizens, and we call this difference the
“turnout gap.”
A turnout gap can be a problem for a healthy democracy. High propensity voters may become more politically
influential than low propensity voters. Indeed, research has shown when the turnout gap shrinks, public policy can
dramatically change.
When political scientists and practitioners
conduct randomized controlled trials to
get out the vote (a.k.a., GOTV), the
implicit and sometimes explicit goal is to
narrow this turnout gap. Over the past
fifteen years, researchers have
conducted hundreds of GOTV
experiments, identifying the types of
mobilization efforts that are the most
effective. Campaigns and advocacy
groups have quickly adopted these
practices, often with the assumption that
these methods will close the turnout gap.
We can easily see why this assumption is
widespread. Perhaps high propensity
voters don’t need any further
encouragement to vote—they vote
anyway—and  low propensity voters are
more likely to respond to a nudge to go to
the polls. But what if these experiments
actually do the opposite? What if GOTV methods are more effective for high-propensity citizens than for the
underrepresented, low propensity citizens that they are often designed for?
Figure 1 demonstrates different ways in which experiments may theoretically affect the turnout gap. The
horizontal axis shows the propensity to vote and vertical axis shows the proportion of voters participating in an
election. The three colored lines represent the effects of three hypothetical GOTV interventions, all of which have
the same average effect. Each is compared to the control group, the dashed gray line. When a campaign knocks
on a door or makes a phone call, which of these changes do you think is most likely to happen? Most people
assume that the turnout gap is reduced (the blue line).
Figure 1: Theoretical Effects of Get Out the Vote Interventions on the Voter Turnout Gap
In most cases, this assumption is wrong. As it turns out, GOTV interventions are more likely to increase voting
among those that are already more likely to vote, thereby increasing the turnout gap. In a recent study in
collaboration with Lynn Vavreck, we collected data from 24 GOTV experiments which, in total, were applied to 1.2
million voters. Each of these experiments had a control and a treatment group. The treatment groups received a
door knock, letter, or phone call, while the control groups received no contact. The researchers who had
previously conducted these experiments measured, on average, how much more voters in the treatment groups
voted than the control group.
However, we did something slightly different: rather than just estimating average effects, we tested for variation
across propensity levels. For each of these 1.2 million voters, we constructed a propensity score, indicating how
much citizens with similar demographic characteristics are represented among voters and non-voters.  As we
expected, high propensity voters were generally older, whiter, and wealthier. We then tested whether high-
propensity citizens were more affected by the GOTV intervention than those with low propensities. It turns out that
high propensity voters are much more likely to respond to the treatment. On average, these experiments widened
the turnout gap.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate our results for one such GOTV experiment, the famous “Neighbors” treatment
conducted by Alan Gerber, Don Green, and Chris Larimer. As before, the horizontal axis represents the propensity
to vote. In Figure 2, the vertical axis shows the rates of voter turnout for those in the control group (the dashed
line) and the treatment group (the red line). As the propensity to vote increases, more people in both treatment
and control turnout to vote, but the difference between these lines also increases—that is the turnout gap
widening. Figure 3 demonstrates just how much the gap grows. The vertical axis shows the effect of the
experiment across different levels of propensity. As you can see, as the turnout propensity increases, so does the
strength of the treatment; at high levels of turnout propensity, the treatment effect approaches 12 percentage
points, meaning that these high propensity voters are 12 percentage points more likely to vote after receiving the
treatment. While at the lowest levels of turnout propensity, the effect is only about 2 percentage points—indicating
that the treatments were much more effective high-propensity citizens. Many of the other experiments in our
analysis exhibited the exact same pattern, and when we pool data from all experiments, we find strong evidence
that, on average, GOTV interventions widen the turnout gap.
Figure 2: Turnout of Treatment and Control Groups across Propensity Levels
Figure 3: Effect of Get Out the Vote Intervention on Voter Turnout across Propensity Levels
When academics or campaigns knock on doors or make phone calls, they are attempting to change who votes
and, in many cases, are attempting to decrease political inequality. Our evidence shows that they are actually
accomplishing the opposite: the gap between voters and nonvoters increases. Why does this happen? The
reasons are likely multifaceted, but the result are similar to what happens in many public policy interventions.
Often, interventions designed to decrease inequality have the opposite effect of increasing inequality. For
example, take public health interventions in the United States that were aimed at decreasing infant mortality, a
problem that especially inflicts poor racial minorities. These policies actually widened the gap in infant mortality
between African Americans and whites because infant mortality dropped at a greater rate among whites. This is
likely for the simple reason that educated, wealthy people are more likely to receive information and take action in
response to public health campaigns. Similarly, we find that higher-propensity citizens are more likely to answer
the door or pick up the phone when contacted by campaigners, and if they are contacted, they are more likely to
respond to the treatment.
Voter turnout interventions often increase the turnout gap –thereby exacerbating the gap in political power. Does
that mean that GOTV campaigns are bad idea? No, not all – as we indicated, increased voter turnout can have
important and often beneficial policy implications for reducing inequality. However, academics and political
campaigns should examine not just whether their treatment increases voter turnout, but also what it does to the
turnout gap.
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